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In this paper, we build a realistic large-scale agent-based model of the Italian day-
ahead-electricity  market  based  on  a  genetic  algorithm  and  validated  over  several 
weeks  of  2010,  on  the  basis  of  exact  historical  data  about  supply,  demand  and 
network  characteristics.  A  statistical  analysis  confirms  that  the  simulator  well 
replicates the observed prices. A future scenario for the year 2025 is then simulated, 
which takes into account market’s evolution and energy vectors’ price dynamics. The 
future electricity prices are contrasted with the ones that might arise considering also 
the possible (yet unlikely) construction of new nuclear power (NP) plants. It is shown 
that future prices will be higher than the actual ones. NP production can reduce the 
prices and their volatility, but the size of the impact depends on the pattern of the 
expected demand load, and can be negligible. 
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1. Introduction 
The  definition  of  the  electricity  price  dynamics  is  a  challenging  task:  several 
parameters  have  to  be  identified,  such  as  energy  vectors  prices’  path,  demand 
evolution, the structure of the physical constraints and the market settings; moreover, 
the interactions of players that compete in the markets has to be considered too. The 
problem is made complex by the agent’s interactions, which depend on the physical 
and regulatory structure of the environment in which they act. Electricity markets are 
complex systems and have to be modelled and evaluated accordingly. In the literature, 
it has been proposed to evaluate complex system through agent-based simulations, 
which are able to provide a rich understanding of the dynamics of player interaction 
as  well  as  viable  forecasts  of  future  dynamics.  In  particular,  realistic  large-
scale/nationwide agent-based models have already been proposed in the literature, for 
instance,
1  for  the  U.S.,  EMCAS  (Conzelmann  et  al.,  2005),  MAIS  (Sueyoshi  and 
Tadiparthi,  2008),  AMES  (Sun  and  Tesfatsion,  2007);  for  Australia,  NEMSIM 
(Chand et al., 2008); moreover, the agent based methodology has been applied to the 
NETA of England and Wales (Bunn and Oliveira, 2001) and to the German EPEX 
Spot  prices  (Sensfuss  and  Genoese,  2006).  However,  these  models  often  lack  a 
statistical validation, thus reducing the reliability of the what-if simulation. On the 
contrary, the agent-based approach coupled with a statistical analysis that validates it 
can provide a better forecast of the evolution of a complex system’s dynamics, such 
as the Italian wholesale (day ahead) electricity market. This is the aim of our work. In 
order to accurately replicate the pattern of observed price realised in the Italian power 
exchange  (IPEX)  an  agent-based  simulation  is  constructed,  based  on  a  genetic 
algorithm, tailored so as to include each active power plant in the Italian grid and in 
which agents are allowed to make complex bidding strategies across plants and zones. 
The model is validated taking into account real data and contrasting the outcome of 
the simulation with the effective (observed) price time series, for a sufficiently long 
time span. It is shown that the model provides a better fitting than a purely cost-based 
one, which neglects the interactive dimension of agents’ behaviour. Then, a plausible 
scenario for the evolution of the power supply in Italy is described. The year 2025 is 
taken  as  a  reference  future  year;  it  has  been  chosen  sufficiently  away  from  the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"!The agent-based literature on electricity markets is quite vast. For an extensive survey on the topic see 
Guerci et al., 2010.!! $!
simulation period in order to make realistic assumptions about new investments in 
power  plants  that  will  replaced  the  existing  ones  which  will  be  dismissed.  More 
precisely, a future scenario is described based on a forecast of investments and energy 
vectors that is widely used by operators active in the Italian market. Such a scenario, 
elaborated  together  with  REF  (a  leading  Italian  research  company  specialized  in 
energy markets) and discussed and validated with market operators and institutional 
entities, takes into account: i) the existing plans to dismiss power plants, renovate 
power  plants  or  invest  in  new  power  plants,  as  have  been  disclosed  by  existing 
operators;  ii)  a  plausible  evolution  of  the  market  share  of  the  operators;  iii)  the 
planned investment in the grid by the Transmission System Operator (TSO); iv) the 
introduction of new power capacity due to renewable sources considering the EU 
targets; v) the introduction of the best flexible thermal technology that is actually 
being  developed,  which  is  also  needed  for  system  balancing;  vi)  the  forecasted 
evolution of energy vector costs and energy demands. 
Market  operators’  interactions  are  introduced  through  the  agent  based  simulator, 
validated with the existing data, and future energy prices are forecasted in different 
times of the day and period of the year. 
A second future scenario is also considered, which assumes the existence of new 
Nuclear Power plants. Indeed, in Italy, there used to be four
2 NP plants connected to 
the electrical grid, producing more than 4% of that nation’s total electricity in 1986. 
They were closed after a 1987 referendum following the Chernobyl disaster in that 
same year. In 2009, the Italian government launched a plan (law 23/7/09 n. 99 and ff.) 
to build at least four new NP plants in the near future. As a consequence of the new 
trend,  ENEL,  the  major  electricity  producer  in  Italy,  signed  a  memorandum  of 
understanding  with  the  French  EDF  aimed  at  adopting  third-generation  European 
pressurised  reactor  (EPR)  technology  for  the  new  plants.
3  Several  other  energy 
producers in Italy expressed their interest in NP production. However, the government 
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2 In Italy, there were four NP plants connected to the electrical grid (name, connection year, net power 
in MW, type): Caorso, 1978; 860, BWR; E. Fermi, 1965; 260; PWR; Garigliano, 1964; 150; BWR; 
Latina, 1963, 153, Magnox. The fifth one, in Montalto di Castro, was almost completed, but has since 
been phased out. It was recently converted into a conventional power station. Of the four existing 
plants, only Caorso was closed while it was active. The other three were at the end of their lifecycle or 
already in disuse. For a summary of the Italian NP phase-out, see Casale R. (2009). 
3  Memorandum  of  the  understanding  between  ENEL  and  EDF,  signed  February,  24,  2009.  See 
www.enel.it/ewcm/salastampa/comunicati/1600316-1_PDF-1.pdf. ! %!
plan,  which  did  not  have  a  general  consensus  across  operators,  consumers, 
environmental associations and local authorities, was lately halted by a referendum 
that took place just few weeks after the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear accident in Japan 
(although its date had been fixed well in advanced). It is not clear at present if NP 
plants will return to the Italian electrical system. However, taking into account the 
increase  in  hydrocarbons’  costs,  the  security  of  supply  concerns  and  the 
environmental pressures related to global warming, it is well possible (even though 
perhaps  not  quite  probable)  that  NP  production  will  be  reconsidered  and  that  NP 
plants will make their way back into the Italian electricity system. This is therefore a 
scenario that is worth while evaluating, even if it is not possible at present to assess its 
effective  likelihood.  Notice  that,  given  the  long  delays  in  prior  large  Italian 
investment  projects,  taking  into  account  the  strong  opposition  to  NP  by  political 
parties,  local  communities,  consumers  and  environmental  associations  and  on  the 
basis of the long time-to-market of similar projects like the Olkiluoto plant in Finland, 
it is quite implausible that NP plants will be active in Italy before year 2025, if they 
will ever be; this further justifies the choice of the reference year for the forecast 
exercise. 
We believe that our model can be of interest for at least three different streams of 
literature: a) it offers a detailed one-to-one agent-based reconstruction of an economic 
environment  which  is  an  original  attempt,  seldom  performed  in  the  agent-based 
literature;  b)  from  an  electricity  systems  study  perspectives,  it  provides  a  reliable 
analysis  of  a  large  complex  market  such  as  the  Italian  one,  based  on  realistic 
assumptions  and  statistically  validated;  c)  from  an  energy  policy  perspectives,  it 
forecast the future Italian electricity prices contrasting a plausible scenario without 
Nuclear Power plants with a possible, yet more unlikely, one which includes Nuclear 
Power production. 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the actual structure of the 
Italian day-ahead market. In Section 3, the agent-based simulation methodology is 
introduced  and  explained.  In  section  4,  the  data  and  the  statistical  validation  are 
presented and the results of the simulation of the actual market are commented. In 
Section 5, we describe the structure of the prospective scenario for the year 2025, first 
without NP plants and then introducing NP plants into it. The simulation assumptions 
of the electricity prices without and with NP plants are introduced in section 6. The ! &!
results  of  the  simulations  for  the  different  scenarios  are  presented  in  section  7. 
Conclusions and references follow in Section 8. 
 
 
2. The model of the Italian day-ahead market  
2.1. The Italian day-ahead market 
Power generators’ bids at the Italian wholesale day-ahead market (DAM) of the IPEX 
(Italian Power EXchange) consist of
4 !

ˆ  Q  i!'()!

ˆ  P  i*!the quantity that will be produced 
and the minimum price that will be accepted for that quantity for each hour of the 






Qi* production limits that define a feasible production interval for its hourly 
real-power  production  level: 

Q
i d ˆ  Q  i d Qi  (MW).  Generator  cost  curves,  for 
Hydrocarbon-fired  Thermal  (HT)  power  plants,  are  usually  not  smooth.  One 
commonly used approximation is to represent generator total variable costs (i.e. costs 
of operation) as quadratic functions (Shahidehpour et al., 2002). The cost function of 
the i
th thermal power generator is:  
 
TCi = (FPl + ETS  xl)  (aiQ
2
i + biQi +ci),          (1) 
 
where both FPl and xl (Euro/GJ) are fuel-specific parameters: the price of the fuel l 
used by the i
th generator and the conversion value to determine the amount of CO2 
generated by the combustion of a unit of fuel l ([GJ]). ETS is the price of carbon 
permits  in  the  European  Emission  Trading  System.  Coefficients  ai (GJ/MW
2h),  bi 
(GJ/MWh) and ci (GJ/h) are assumed to be constants, but vary across power plants 
with different technologies and efficiency levels. They represent technology-specific 
efficiency  parameters  that  define  the  relationship  between  the  energy  input  and 
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4 The bidding format of supply functions allows a maximum of four couples of prices and quantities 
offered. However, a simple statistical analysis performed on historical data shows that almost 75% of 
the offers are composed of a single point bid. ! +!
output. The constant term (FPl + ETS  xl)  ci corresponds to the no-load cost, the 
quasi-fixed costs that generators bear if they continue to run at almost zero output. 
However, these costs vanish if energy is not supplied. 
We assume, as is common in the literature for HT power plants (Stoft, 2002), that 
plants’ amortisation is being repaid by marginal rent that is assigned to producer g, 
once the energy price is set by the system. The marginal costs MCi for the i
th thermal 
generator can be easily derived from the cost function TCi: 
 
MCi = (FPl + ETS  xl)  (aiQi + bi)                (2) 
 
Demand  is  assumed  to  be  rigid.  After  receiving  all  generators'  bids,  the  market 
operator,  Gestore  del  Mercato  Elettrico  (GME)  in  Italy,  clears  the  market  by 
performing a total welfare maximisation, subject to the equality constraints posed by 
the  zonal  energy  balance  (Kirchhoff's  laws)  and  inequality  constraints,  i.e.,  the 
maximum and minimum capacity of each power plant and inter-zonal transmission 
limits. This is generally denoted as the DC optimal power flow - DCOPF. The welfare 
maximisation,  given  inelastic  demands,  corresponds  to  the  total  production  costs 
minimisation problem providing the locational marginal price (LMP). The LMP is the 
shadow price of the active power balance equations constraint (Kirchhoff’s law) in 
each zone (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004). In the Italian market, an LMP is set for each 
zone, namely a subset of the transmission network that groups local unconstrained 
connections. Moreover, an average national price (Prezzo Unico Nazionale - PUN) is 
also calculated as the average of zonal prices, weighted on the basis of the zonal load. 
Zones are defined and updated by the TSO (Terna, in the case of Italy) based on the 
evolution  and  the  structure  of  the  transmission  power-flow  constraints.  The 
transmission network model considered in this paper reproduces exactly the zonal 
market  structure  and  the  relative  maximum  transmission  capacities  between 




& See Terna website: http://www.terna.it/default/Home/SISTEMA_ELETTRICO/mercato_elettrico/ ! ,!
In our work, we take into account  real demand, including that traded on forward 
markets,  which  is  effectively  dispatched.  Supply  from  imports  (corresponding,  in 
general, to power generated abroad by cheap technologies, such as hydro or nuclear 
power,  coming  mainly  from  France  and  Switzerland),  hydropower  (including 
pumped-storage facilities) and other renewables is modelled as must-run production 
at zero-price. Bilateral contracts are modelled on the supply side as quantities at zero-
price. The system marginal price is given in each zone by the LMP of the marginal 
thermal  technology.  For  HT  plants,  the  profit  per  hour  Ri  for  the  i
th  generator 
belonging to zone k is obtained as follows: 
 
Ri = ZPk  Qi
*  TCi Qi
*                (3) 
 
where Qi
* is the equilibrium quantity generated by each power plant. It is the quantity 
that  solves  the  TSO’s  cost  minimisation  problem,  given  the  constraints  and  the 
quantity offered by each plant. ZPk is the set of LMP prices calculated by the TSO for 
each zone k  {1, 2, ..., K}.  
 
 
3. The agent-based simulation methodology 
3.1. The agent-based model 
The constructed model replicates the rules and adopts the exact historical information 
of the DAM. Demand is assumed to be price-inelastic and equals the historical load 
profile  for  the  observation  period.  The  supply  side  of  the  market  is  composed  of 
generation companies (GenCos) submitting bids for each of their power plants and 
gaining an overall profit, which corresponds to the sum of the profits displayed in 
Equation 3 for each plant they own. Agents/GenCos simultaneously submit 24 bids, 
one for each hourly session of the wholesale market.  Each hourly market is assumed 
to be independent. Plants are grouped by five major technologies: coal-fired (CF), oil-
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fired (OF), combined cycle (CC), combined heat and power (CHP) and turbo-gas 
(TG). Each g
th GenCo, g = (1, 2, .., G), owns 
g
f z M ,  thermal power plants in zone z 
with technology f. We collect the 
g
f z M ,  power plants of GenCo g in zone z and of 
technology f in a representative generating unit r = (z, f), and we assume that GenCo g 
adopts a common strategy for them. By doing so, we reduce the size of the strategy 
space. Let us denote 
g
r N as the number of representative generating units of GenCo g 
in all zones and for all technologies. For every r and every hour h, each GenCo g bids 
to  the  DAM 
g
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([Euro/MWh])  corresponds  to  a  limit  price,  where 
g
r a    
g
r A denotes  the  common 
mark-up value adopted for all power plants belonging to the representative power unit 
r  and 
g
i r MC ,   is  the  marginal  cost  of  the  i
th  power  plant  belonging  to  the  r
th 
representative  power  plant  owned  by  GenCo  g.  GenCos  are  assumed  to  bid  the 




i r Q Q , , ˆ    [MW]. Let 
g A  denote the action 
space  of  GenCo  g.  It  equals  the  Cartesian  product  of  the  action  space  of  each 
representative unit it owns: 
g
r r
g A A u   , where 
g
r A  denotes the action space of the 
representative  generating  unit.    Actions  are  mark-up  levels.  In  the  computational 
experiments, we assume 
g
r A != {1.00, 1.04, 1.08, …, 5.00}, corresponding to a mark-
up increase value of 4% and a maximum mark-up value of 500%, with respect to the 
marginal cost, for a total of 100 actions.  
 
3.2. The agent-based genetic algorithm
6 
The strategy space of a given GenCos can be huge. In order to make the problem 
computationally  tractable,  a  learning  procedure  based  on  a  standard  genetic 
evolutionary process has been employed. Each GenCo repeatedly interact with the 
other companies at the end of each run U  1, …, R, that is, they all submit bids to the 
DAM according to their current beliefs on opponents’ strategies. At the beginning of 
run U, GenCos need to study the current market situation in order to identify a better 
reply to the opponents, to be played at the end of run U. In order to explore its strategy 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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space in search of a better strategy, the g
th GenCo need to repeatedly solve the market 
for different private strategies, kept fixed the strategies of its opponents at run U . 
This procedure is adopted in order to enable each GenCo to learn foregone profits by 
exploring the profitability of fictive actions. A standard genetic algorithm is adopted, 
in order to keep a large population of candidate strategies and to improve at the same 
time their fitness/performance in the market. We define a population of size Po of 
strategies, which will evolve throughout the KU generations belonging to run U.  The 
number of generations per run varies with the run U. The idea is to favour exploration 
in initial rounds (small values for KU) and then to exploit the gained experience (large 
values  for  KU),  expressed  in  the  final  population  of  candidates  by  the  relative 
frequency of occurrences of each candidate solution 

Fmg. Then, at the end of each run 
U, each GenCo bids to the market by selecting one strategy belonging to its current 
population of candidates. The selection is done according to a probabilistic choice 
model in order to favour the most represented strategy in the population, i.e., the one 
that has best responded to the evolutionary pressure by ensuring the highest fitness. 



















                (4) 
where 
U S
g m  expresses the probability of selecting action mg at run U. Summarizing, the 
algorithm can be seen as an “approximate” best reply at each run because of three 
aspects. First of all, at each run the population of candidate solutions represents only a 
subset  of  all  actions.  Secondly,  even  if  the  number  of  generations  progressively 
increases it is limited and does not guarantee convergence to the optimal action for 
the current population. Lastly, we adopt a probabilistic choice model to select at the 
end of each run, the action being played by each GenCo. Model’s parameters have 
been calibrated in such a way that during the final run all the GenCos select their 
optimal action given the final population of strategies. In particular, there are four 
parameters that have to be determined in order to run the experiment: U, KU, Po, O . In 
this paper we have adopted the following assumption: U , KU {3,..., 25}, Po = 
300,  O  = 2. Finally, it is worth mentioning that we have adopted for all simulations ! "=!
the common procedure to include in the initial population of candidate actions the no 
mark-up case, that is, the bid at marginal cost. Furthermore, we have imposed that the 




4. Data, calibration and results for the year 2010. 
4.1. The data used for the simulation. 
One of the aims of the paper is to propose a highly realistic computational model of a 
liberalized electricity market, which is able to perform analyses of scenarios. In order 
to measure the performance level of the simulator, we adopt a goodness of fit criterion 
over a sufficiently long PUN time series observed in the Italian market. In particular, 
we  validate  the  adopted  methodology  and  modelling  assumptions  by  choosing  to 
simulate the hourly PUN of an entire week, for three different weeks of the year, that 
corresponds to different  yearly load profiles, namely high-, mid- and low-demand 
periods.  The  most  recent  yearly  data  available  for  our  work  refer  to  2010.  We 
consider a week in July, a month that usually displays a peak in demand, the last week 
of  September,  when  demand  is  at  a  medium  level,  when  it  is  coupled  with  non-
extreme weather conditions, and a mid-week of April, that historically corresponds to 
the second lowest bottom in demand. The lowest bottom is in August, however this 
has  not  been  considered,  because  of  the  holiday  period  coupled  with  high 
temperatures,  which  would  make  the  figures  quite  unrepresentative  of  the  Italian 
electricity market.
7  
The chosen data refer to the 15
th week of 2010 (from the 12
th of April to the 18
th), the 
28
th week (from the 12
th of July to the 18
th) and the 39
th week (from the 27
th of 
September to the 3
rd of October), for a total of 504 hourly observations. Table 1 
reports the fuel prices used for the simulations, both for the years 2010 and 2025. 
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Table  1:  Fuel  (!/GJ)  and  ETS  ((!/tCO2)  prices  used  in  the  computational 
experiments. Year 2010 (average weekly price) and 2025 (daily price). 
 
At the date chosen for our simulation experiment, the chosen set of HT power plants 
consisted of 223 generating units grouped according to five technologies: CF, OF, 
CC, CHP and TG. These power plants were independently or jointly owned by 19 
different GenCos. If a plant is jointly owned, it was attributed to the GenCo holding 
the largest share. The GenCos are: A2A, AA_API, AceaElectrabel, AE EW, AES, 
ATEL,  EDIPOWER,  EDISON,  EGL,  Elettrogorizia,  ENEL  Produzione, 
ENIPOWER, EnPlus, Eon, ERG, Iride, SET, SORGENIA and TIRRENO Power. For 
each hour of each considered day, we have determined exactly from real GME data 
which power-plants of the considered database effectively bid. Hourly subsets of the 
223  HT  power-plants  have  been  adopted  to  simulate  independently  each  hourly 
market. Summarizing, both the supply and demand sides of the market have been 
simulated exactly in terms of both aggregate and individual values. Furthermore, the 
exact  values  of  hourly  transmission  limit  constraints  have  been  considered  in  the 
simulations, as provided by GME.  
 
4.2.  Simulation results for 2010. 
For  each  scenario,  10  computational  experiments  were  carried  out  independently. 
Averages were computed to estimate market outcomes. Over time, the profit-seeking 
agents learn what bidding prices to submit to the IPEX, using the algorithm described 
in the previous section. The simulated scenario is contrasted with the effective PUN 
observed  for  each  hour  of  the  observation  period.  Figures  1,  2  and  3  display  the 
observed and simulated PUNs for the three weeks in 2010. They also show the cost-! "#!
based prices, i.e., the prices obtained from a hypothetical scenario in which firms do 
not add any mark-up to their marginal costs. Moreover, hourly market demands are 
plotted in the figures as well. Table 2 reports the summary statistics. Data refer to 
each single week of the period and to the overall sample of 504 observations. They 
are grouped by the day, and peak hours (from 8am to 8pm Mon-Fri) and off-peak 
hours are differentiated.
8 For each group, the table reports the mean observed and 
simulated price (Euro/MWh), the correlation coefficient between the former and the 
latter and the root mean square error between the historical and simulated prices, both 
in terms of their absolute value (Euro/MWh) and in terms of the percentage of the 
observed price. 
 
Figure 1: real (gray line), estimated (black line) and cost-based (dotted line) prices -
left axis; market demand (dashed line) - right axis; for the 15
th week of 2010 (April) 
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Figure 2: real (gray line), estimated (black line) and cost-based (dotted line) prices -
left axis; market demand (dashed line) - right axis; for the 28
th week of 2010 (July) 
 ! "%!
 
Figure 3: real (gray line), estimated (black line) and cost-based (dotted line) prices -
left  axis;  market  demand  (dashed  line)  -  right  axis;  for  the  39





Table 2. Summary statistics for the 2010 simulations and comparison between real 
and simulated prices. 
 ! "&!
We  can  see  that  there  is  a  satisfactory  fit  with  the  historical  data.  The  simulated 
patterns of the PUN follow the observed ones quite well, both in terms of trends and 
absolute  values.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  statistics  of  the  simulation. The  overall 
correlation coefficient equals 0,78. All estimates show correlations higher than 72%, 
except for the September-October week peak hours estimates and April’s off peak 
hours estimates. There is also a solid fit in terms of the PUN’s absolute values. The 
overall root mean square error equals 13 Euro/MWh; it is higher during peak hours 
(when the average price is higher) and lower during off-peak hours. The week for 
which the estimate performs worse is in July, in particular for the peak hours, for 
which the root mean square error is about 25% of the average observed prices. All 
other simulated prices perform much better, in particular those for the peak hours 
during the other two weeks, for which the root mean square error is not higher than 
12% of the observed prices. The behaviour of peak hours for the week in July might 
be due to some strategic behaviour that has influenced the market price. In particular, 
we notice that it is coupled with the highest demand. Having fixed the number of 
plants, this reduces the market competition. There might have been some (implicit) 
collusive strategy that cannot be replicated by the simulator. By observing the shape 
of the simulated and historical PUN curves, we can see that there is also a discrepancy 
for  the  off-peak  hours,  due  to  higher  simulated  prices  for  the  off-peak  hours  of 
working days, in particular for those in April. A plausible explanation for such a 
behaviour has emerged during conversation with market operators. We consider in 
our simulator a normal set up for HT plants. However, because of the economic crisis 
and the consequent fall in consumption levels the huge investments in mid-merit HT 
plants  are  highly  affected.  In  order  to  guarantee  a  certain  number  of  hours  of 
production and not to incur in high shut-down and start-up costs, GenCos alter the set 
up of HT plants, mostly in night hours, forcing them to produce at a reduced quantity 
and lower marginal cost. This is confirmed by the analysis of bids submitted to the 
market,
9 showing that in night hours, bids are lower than plants’ marginal costs at 





Nevertheless,  we  stress  that  there  is  a  good  fit  between  the  simulation  and  the 
observed data. It performs much better than a purely cost-based one. This shows that 
the simulation is able to reproduce most of the behaviours of agents in the market.   
 
 
5. The 2025 scenario 
5.1. The forecasted scenario. 
The 2025 scenario depicts the future structure of electricity supply and demand.
10 It 
starts by evaluating the Italian economic growth, which is expected to return to its 
(low) long run level. This determines the recovery of the electricity demand growth 
after  the  present  economic  crisis.  However,  the  composition  of  demand  will  be 
changed by the reduction of residential demand, due to improved energy efficiency, 
and the increase in the service sector demand, coupled with the increase in private 
transportation and heating needs. By 2025, the electricity demand is expected to be 
equal to 421.1 TWh. The future hourly composition of the market thermal load, i.e., 
the  net  demand  for  self-production,  renewables,  imports  and  pumped-storage 
hydroelectric, will be different from the current one. On one hand, there is expected to 
be a rise in production from renewables, fostered by European and national programs 
for the development of sustainable energy. As a result, it is expected that 30% of 
electricity consumption needs will be filled by renewables in the year 2025, of which 
40% will be hydroelectric, 17% wind power and 23% PV. On the other hand, there 
will probably be a reduction in imports, due to a reduction in base load electricity 
production in Germany and Switzerland, following their NP phase-out, which will be 
replaced by some other more-expensive forms of energy. Moreover, the reduction in 
residential demand is coupled with an enhanced domestic efficiency due to improved 
two-sided real-time metering that increases off-peak demand. As a result, the hourly 
profile  of  the  market  thermal  load  is  expected  to  assume  a  more  uniform  shape 
compared  to  that  of  2010,  with  reduced  differences  between  night-time  and  peak 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"=!The scenario has been developed by REF, a leading consultancy company in Italy and discussed with 
operators and public bodies. For more details, please contact REF at the following email address: 
vcanazza@ref-online.it ! ",!
hours. The hourly profile for the market thermal load for the simulation period is 
displayed in Figures 4 and 5 (right axis).  
The structure of supply is expected to evolve also. On one hand, older power plants 
are expected to be switched off on the basis of their age or repowered according to 
plans brought to the market by operators. This, however, will not change the actual 
power supply structure very much until 2020, given that the Italian power plants are 
quite new on average. 60% entered into production after 2000. 35% entered after 
2005. A new large ultra-super critical coal-fired plant (about 2 GW at Porto Tolle) is 
expected  to  be  operating  by  2021,  together  with  other  CC  units.  After  2020,  the 
estimated need for new installed capacity rises in order to maintain the adequacy of 
supply. The reserve margin is expected to fall far below the targeted level of adequacy 
(23%),  because  of  the  dismissal  of  old  plants  and  the  increasing  relevance  of 
renewables.  This  implies  that  there  will  be  an  increasing  need  for  new,  flexible 
capacity  in  order  to  balance  the  system.  The  price  signals  on  the  DAM  and  the 
ancillary service market would induce new investment in the best flexible technology, 
which, at present, we expect to be the full-flexible combined cycles gas turbines with 
a  top  efficiency  factor  of  61%.  The  long-run  scenario  doesn’t  consider  the 
introduction of any new mechanism
11 that would guarantee capacity adequacy. Thus, 
the system will gradually become inadequate to cover the overall demand, and boom-
bust investment cycles will occur. Such a dynamic is related to strong overcapacity 
and low margins for market participants during the boom phase, and capacity shortage 
and elevated margins during the bust cycles. For our simulation, this implies that, by 
the  year  2025,  there  will  be  newly  installed  fully-flexible  combined  cycles  gas 
turbines (we will identify these as “new CCGT”, using the acronym NC) that will 
have a capacity of 14 GW. A caveat must be placed about the ownership of NC and 
the market share of operators. Indeed, it is expected that actual market share will not 
change too much, on the basis of the divested investment plans of existing operators, 
until 2020. In that year, ENEL is expected to be the biggest operator, holding a 35% 
market share, measured in terms of capacity installed. By 2025, however, when new 
investments in NC will have been introduced into the market, such a new capacity 





attributing  such  a  new  capacity  to  a  single  owner  implies  abruptly  changing  the 
market structure of Italian electricity production from a market characterized by a 
leader and several smaller followers to an almost pure duopoly. The other operators’ 
market shares will be dramatically reduced by 2025. This is highly implausible. The 
new capacity will have to be planned, financed and constructed by companies. It is 
likely that existing operators, being already active in the Italian market, will exploit, 
at least partially, their  pre-emption advantages  when investing in the new NC.  In 
order to provide a plausible description of market evolution, we assume that the flow 
of investment to new capacity will be partially distributed across active operators and 
partially  attributed  to  potential  entrants.  More  precisely,  it  will  be  uniformly 
distributed
12 across the 28 existing GenCos in 2020. There will also be 12 newcomers 
that will provide an additional 6600 MW of capacity to the market. In the case of NP 
production scenario, these new plants will be displaced by the NP investments, as 
explained below. 
New transmission and interconnection lines are expected to be completed according 
to the Terna Strategic Plan (Terna, 2011), which has planned the investment aimed at 
eliminating zonal congestion. Accordingly, zonal prices will become uniform across 
zones by 2015.  
Energy vectors’ prices
13 are expected to continue to covariate with Brent. The latter is 
expected to reduce slowly from a 110$/bbl spike and converge with the long-run limit 
set  at  77$/bbl.  As  a  consequence,  oil  prices  in  2025  will  equal  89$/bbl.  The 
dollar/euro exchange rate is expected to oscillate around 1.42$ by year 2025, and the 
price differential across energy vectors is assumed to replicate the actual one. The NG 
price is linked to oil prices through a standard indexing formula. Finally, the ETS cost 
is assumed to reach 28 euro/tonCO2. 
 
5.2. The new Italian NP plants. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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operators. It corresponds to the application of the probabilistic principle of “insufficient reason”, which 
claims  that  an  equal  probabilistic  treatment  is  appropriate  for  similar  cases,  when  there  is  no 
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At present, several aspects of the possible NP re-introduction in Italy are unclear. The 
number and characteristics of the new NP plants have not been defined,
14 nor have 
their  locations  been  revealed.  Italy’s  major  utility,  ENEL,  has  established  a 
partnership with EDF to build and operate four 1650 MWe reactors based on EPR 
technology, which is currently being implemented in Flamanville, France. Even if 
other utilities (such as E-On) are interested in taking on leading roles in nuclear build 
projects, ENEL’s plan seems to be the most developed (i.e., it is the plan that is most 
likely to be undertaken), at least in terms of the data that has been disclosed so far.  
The location of the four plants is still unknown; however, it is likely that these will be 
uniformly distributed across the major zones, the North, Centre-North, Centre-South 
and South, for the following reasons: i) such a distribution would minimise the impact 
on the transmission network and reduce transmission losses; this would be coherent 
with the Terna Strategic Plan aimed at eliminating zonal congestion by 2015; ii) a 
uniform distribution might reduce the opposition of local communities, which may be 
exacerbated by the concentration of NP plants in particular regions; iii) it roughly 
corresponds to the distribution of former NP sites, which shows the distribution of the 
proper sites in terms of geographical and geological characteristics to host NP plants.  
We assume that the increased capacity based on NP installation will reduce the need 
for investments in NC in the NP scenarios, given that NP power is a must-run base 
load. This implies that NC capacity is lowered to 7.4 GW under the two NP scenarios, 
and the additional 6.6 GW are replaced by NP capacity. There is one important point 
regarding the ownership of the NP plants. The memorandum of understanding that 
ENEL signed with EDF states that the NP plants will be operated by a joint ENEL-
EDF company that will be open to other producers, but the majority of shares will be 
retained  by  ENEL.  It  is  agreed  that  ENEL  will  have  priority  over  electricity 
production  and  usage.  At  present,  it  is  unclear  what  share  of  NP  plants  will  be 
divested to other market operators and how the electricity produced will be sold in the 
market. For example, it is unknown whether it will be sold through forward contracts 
or spot contracts. However, it seems plausible to assume that the NP plants’ market 
operation will be managed by ENEL and that it will be regulated in the spot market. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Different assumptions would simply result in a lower share of NP electricity owned 
by ENEL. Results would change accordingly. 
 
6. The simulation of PUN in 2025 without and with NP plants 
6.1 The agent-based simulation of 2025 without NP 
We  assume  that  market  rules  will  remain  unchanged.  Therefore,  we  repeat  the 
simulation exercise described in Section 3 for 2025 without NP plants. This is called 
the NO-NP Scenario. We simulate the price for four days, a working day and an off-
peak day during the same weeks of the year as in the previous simulation. We chose 
not to replicate the analysis for the entire week, because the forecast of hourly loads 
does not change significantly across consecutive days, except when these switch from 
working  days  to  weekend  ones.  The  price  is  simulated  for  the  24  hours  of  a 
Wednesday and a Saturday of the 28
th and 39
th week of 2025, specifically for the 9
th 
and 12
th of July and the 1
st and 4
th of October. On these days, there will be 40 active 
agents in the market.  
 
6.2 Introducing NP plants 
The simulation of prices in year 2025 for the representative days chosen is repeated, 
with the introduction of NP plants. The methodology introduced in Section 3.1 is 
updated,  assuming  that  four  EPR  reactors  will  be  active  in  the  NP  scenario.  The 
following equation describes the cost function of an NP plant: 
 
TCNP(QNP) = dQNP ,                (5) 
 
where d is the (constant) NP marginal cost that depends, inter alia, on the technology 
adopted,  the  uranium  cost,  the  enrichment  process  costs  and  the  operation  and 
maintenance (O&M) expenses, including waste cycle management. QNP is the energy ! #"!
supplied to the market by the NP plant. The marginal cost of NP has been set at 10 
Euros/MWh.
15  
In the NP scenario a single agent that owns the NP plants is added to the other 28 
agents that represent HT power plants, replacing the 12 NC producers that were active 
under  the  NO-NP  scenario.  We  assume  that  NP  plants  will  not  be  operated 
strategically, while all other agents can strategically bid on the HT technologies. The 
NP producer always bids at the NP marginal cost, i.e., its bid is (d, 4·QNP). Bids are 
always accepted and constitute the base load of energy production, which is consistent 
with  the  observed  behaviour  of  other  markets  with  active  NP  plants.  Such  an 
assumption  allows  us  not  to  specify  the  NP  plants’  profit  function,  which  is  not 
needed since we do not intend to evaluate ex ante the optimality of the decision to 




7. The Italian wholesale electricity price by 2025  
We report the simulation results for the chosen days in 2025 in Figures 4 and 5. The 
figures  display  the  hourly  prices  in  the  two  scenarios  (left  axis)  and  the  market 
demand (right axis), for the Wednesday (left panel) and Saturday (right panel) in July 
(Figure 4) and October (Figure 5). Table 3 describes the summary statistics for the 
chosen days, distinguishing between peak and off-peak hours. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"&!This is the average NP marginal cost in the literature (Du and Pearson (2009), MIT (2009), OECD 
and IEA NEA (2010)), updated to take into account the appraisal of the Euro/Dollar exchange rate. In 
any case, for the purposes of our simulation, the exact cost is not relevant, because NP is a must-run 
technology that is always a baseload for the electricity production. ! ##!
 
Figure 4: simulated prices for the NO-NP scenario (blue circle-marked line) and NP 
scenario (black diamond-marked line) -left axis; market demand (dashed line) - right 
axis; Wednesday the 4th (left panel) and Saturday the 9th (right panel) of July 2025. 
 ! #$!
 
Figure 5: simulated prices for the NO-NP scenario (blue  circle-marked line), NP 
scenario (black diamond-marked line) -left axis; market demand (dashed line) - right 








Table  3  Simulated  prices  for  the  NO-NP  scenario  and  NP  scenario;  summary 
statistics ! #%!
 
The plotted time series show quite different behaviours between the two periods of 
the year. The simulation for the days in July shows a rather stable pattern for the 
hourly demand, completely flat for the peak hours. This is coupled with an almost 
uniform shape for the peak-hours’ prices in the NO-NP time series, which becomes 
slightly more volatile during the off-peak ones. The October demand is higher and 
more volatile across all hours. The simulated electricity prices are higher and more 
volatile too. In particular, notice that they spike up to almost 160 Euro/MWh in the 
peak hours. Comparing the NO-NP prices with the simulated ones for the year 2010, 
we can see that on average we should expect higher future prices, particularly for the 
October week. Indeed, the increase in prices is due to a rise in peak hours one for the 
October simulation and a (lower) increase for the off peak ones. The average rise of 
peak hours’ prices in July 2025 is just 8.6%, while the October prices almost double 
(82% rise). We can observe also a 15% increase in off peak prices in July and a 54% 
rise in October.  
Contrasting the NO-NP scenario with the NP one, we can see that the NP price time 
series is lower and less volatile, for both periods of the year and time of the day. This 
can be observed by comparing the NO-NP time series with the NP ones. When prices 
are low, as it is in July, the reduction is extremely small: 0.6% in peak hours and 6.6% 
in off-peak hours. The reduction is higher when prices are high, as is for the October 
simulations:  30%  in  peak  hours  and  27.5%  in  off-peak  hours.  In  October,  the 
introduction of NP also reduces the volatility, while it slightly increases it in July, 
remaining extremely low, though. We can summarize the findings by pointing out 
that the impact of NP on electricity prices corresponds to what one expects, namely 
that  the  higher  the  price,  the  more  NP  reduces  prices  and  stabilizes  the  market. 
However, its relevance in terms of price reduction is highly different, depending on 
the hour of the day and the size of the demand load. Moreover, for some peak-hours 
simulation, it can even be negligible.  
 
 
8. Conclusions ! #&!
In  the  paper  a  realistic  agent-based  model  was  created  that  replicates  the  Italian 
market,  with  its  structural  supply  and  transmission  conditions.  The  computational 
results  show  that  the  model  is  able  to  simulate  the  real  Italian  day-ahead  market 
performances better  than  a  perfect  competition  cost-based  model.  In  the  proposed 
framework, agents are able to achieve higher prices by learning their optimal bidding 
strategies, thus pushing prices above the marginal costs. Sellers take into account their 
total costs of production, including no-load costs, and generate a pricing behaviour 
that  follows  the  pattern  of  the  historical  one  quite  well.  The  few  observed  price 
discrepancies might be due to some characteristics of the simulation assumptions, as 
previously discussed. In particular, we highlight that no collusion among agents is 
allowed in the model. Moreover, only simple bids are assumed, while in reality, 25% 
of  bids  are  complex,  such  as  multiple  prices  and  quantities,  thus  hockey-stick 
strategies that might arise are not considered in the simulation. One further source of 
discrepancy comes out from a specific modelling assumptions related to the historical 
characteristic  of  the  market  scenarios  learned  by  the  adaptive  agents.  In  order  to 
simulate electricity prices for hour x of day y, agents learn on a scenario which is 
based on the exact historical information about the hour x of day y. However, because 
of the actual intrinsic uncertainty about the one day ahead forecast and the seasonal 
behaviour of several market factors, it is well possible that the fit would improve if 
agents learned on the scenario of hour x of the day y-7 or on other combinations of 
past scenarios. The misalignment between the expected demand and supply and the 
real one is a potential source of mismatch among bidding strategies in the current 
model. A detailed study on the optimal assumptions on past expectations that would 
determines the best fit goes beyond the aim of this paper; however, it is certainly an 
intriguing research issue that will be addressed in future works. 
In the paper, the simulation model is first compared to the observed prices. Then, it is 
projected in the future, introducing a plausible market scenario based on conjectures 
discussed and validated with real market operators.  In such a scenario, prices  are 
simulated.  It  is  shown  that  future  prices  will  be  on  average  higher  than  actual 
(simulated) ones. The rise will be more relevant during periods of high expected load.  
A  further  scenario with Nuclear  Power  plants is also considered.  The  simulations 
show that NP production will reduce prices and their volatility. The effect, however, ! #+!
is different across times of the day, being high in periods of high prices, but quite 
negligible when prices are lower.  
An  important  caveat  must  be  mentioned  when  interpreting  the  results  of  our 
simulation. Indeed, the results depend on the foreseen market structure. Even if we 
have  made  great  efforts  to  describe  and  incorporate  a  realistic  description  of  the 
market in 2025 into our simulator, we are well aware that our scenario depends on 
several  assumptions  that  need  not  necessarily  be  realised  in  the  future.  Different 
scenarios will imply different prices. Our simulation is intended as a tool to evaluate, 
in  a  realistic  context,  the  future  electricity  prices  under  different  assumptions  for 
power  production,  but  should  not  be  intended  as  a  precise  projection  of  future 
electricity prices. Moreover, in our work, we have not taken into account the choice to 
reintroduce NP itself. Rather, we have performed a what-if type of study, without 
evaluating the optimality of NP investments from the point of view of the investor or 
from a social welfare perspective. In order to do so, a clear estimate of NP investment 
costs  is  needed,  which  is  not  available  at  present.  Moreover,  we  have  solely 
considered marginal costs, without taking into account replacement costs, risks and 
environmental externalities. If we were to take into account all the consequences of 
NP production and the entire set of costs, the possible impact on total welfare of NP 
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